This article was first published on the RPRN website
This article is an excerpt of a longer piece on contemporary terminological debates. This version also appears in French on Politika.
Discourse is core to politics and the words we use have an impact on the worlds we create. This is why much of my work to date has focused on the importance of terminological choices. Some words can euphemise dangerous politics and render them more acceptable. Others can mislead and potentially exaggerate traits. Some I argue bring a sense of urgency and accuracy, and the refusal to use them speaks more to a lack of commitment to anti-fascism than to a reasonable stance. The absence of some words is telling in and of itself and speaks to what has been termed epistemologies of ignorance (Mills 1997; Sullivan and Tuana 2007):
A particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologically and socially functional), producing the ironic outcome that whites will in general be unable to understand the world they have made (Mills 1997: 18).
Put simply, the silence of those in positions of power on certain issues can tell us as much as their words.
Terminological debates are always a tightrope and the aim here is not to settle debates or even argue that the terminology I use is the best or the definitive one. But I believe these debates are key if we are to take our role and the process of double hermeneutic, that is how our work does not simply speak of society but to it, seriously (Giddens 1987; Stavrakakis 2024).
The myriad of terms used in the field across time tells us much about the way our approach to studying such politics has evolved (for a detailed overview, see Newth et al 2025). ‘Extreme right’ was for a long time the preferred term to discuss the early resurgence of parties on the right of the right, many of which had clear ties to fascist politics. Think for example of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National (FN – now Rassemblement National (RN)), a party funded by neo-fascists in the early 1970s with many members and leaders nostalgic of fascist regimes. It was telling that at the time, Le Pen, himself a supporter of Marshal Pétain’s rehabilitation and a Holocaust denier, was nominated president of the party as he was seen as a more acceptable and moderate figure compared to other members.
The move to ‘radical right’ occurred at the turn of the century as these parties developed their process of reconstruction, moving away from their sulphurous past and discourse and adopting instead – more or less openly and consciously – strategies developed by the Nouvelle Droite and right-wing Gramscism. This meant that these parties unequivocally and openly denounced racism and, at least superficially, welcomed democratic rules. While it was clear to those paying attention that this move was cosmetic and discursive rather than ideological (Crépon et al 2015, Collovald 2004), it has been incredibly successful, allowing these parties to escape the margins of politics and society. This often took place through the reconstruction of old extreme right parties and their move away from the more antagonising and illliberal articulations of reactionary politics (think for example of the FN, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO) or the Sweden Democrats (SD)). For the FN in particular, this was a conscious move following the influence of members of the French Nouvelle Droite, either directly via infiltration or indirectly via a transfer of ideas. This could not be clearer than in the move away from openly racist inflammatory language to that of culture and ‘religion’, building clearly on extreme-right intellectual Alain de Benoist’s theories, who also had a significant impact on the Alt-Right in the US. In other countries, this move took place through the replacement of extreme right parties with ‘new’ ones that were able to build on the distinction between them and their extreme counterparts. This could be seen for example in the UK and Germany, where UKIP and the AfD benefitted from a degree of complacency through the comparison with the BNP or the NPD, as well as their roots in academic, conservative circles. Even though it was clear from early on that these parties were ideologically anchored to reactionary politics, the combination of a shift in discourse and the ability to compare positively to a more extreme right allowed them to occupy a space between both, and to pretend that they were legitimate actors in the democratic process, despite this being a low bar in times of post-democracy.
Unsurprisingly, this is also when the term ‘populism’ became popular in the literature and wider public discourse. It is worth noting here that the resurgence of the concept partly originated from the extreme right itself, with Jean-Marie Le Pen attempting to link his party to the term in the early 90s, which was then taken up in French academia and eventually absorbed in much of the literature (Collovald 2004). Crucially, most serious work on the matter argues that populism is at best peripheral, either acting as a thin ideology (Mudde 2007) or discourse Stavrakakis 2024), and that attention should be placed on core ideological elements. This is something that has been broadly ignored, even in academia, where the term has been used haphazardly by careless academics jumping on the bandwagon in search of funding and citations (see Sophia Hunger and Fred Paxton’s excellent research (2022) on the misuses of populism in academia and Goyvaerts et al 2024 on populist hype).
Many, starting perhaps with Annie Collovald (2004), have argued it is not only an altogether inaccurate term, but also dangerous in that it allows for the normalisation and euphemisation of reactionary politics which could henceforth be couched in the name of ‘the people’ even though they are innately elitist. Therefore, the fact that populism became so common in the media, but also in academia, is possibly the most obvious indication that the process of mainstreaming is one that starts with mainstream actors rather than one that simply originates in the far right itself and is a tribute of their own success.
Finally, the term ‘far right’ has become increasingly used in the late 2010s as ‘extreme right’ became limited to the more extreme forms of such politics, and the use of ‘radical right’ ebbed. Aaron Winter and I (2020) settled on a mixed use of both far and extreme right to map the context in which we witnessed the rise of reactionary politics. We used
the term ‘extreme right’ for those movements and activists who express ‘illiberal’ articulations of racism and engage in violence, whether verbal or physical. We use ‘far right’ to describe movements and parties that espouse a racist ideology, but do so in an indirect, coded and often covert manner, notably by focusing on culture and/or occupying the space between illiberal and liberal racisms, between the extreme and the mainstream. Of course, this separation between mainstream, far- and extreme right is a product of historical and ideological processes and constructions; but we believe that, for our purposes, it provides a particularly effective framework.
More recent developments have also made me rethink the role of fascism in explaining our current context and whether the term has a role to play in helping us understand where we are and where we are heading. The militarisation of the state and borders in the twenty-first century and the resurgence of eugenics accelerating with the Covid-19 pandemic have demonstrated that policies and ideas core to what had made fascism a political bogeyman for much of the second half of the twentieth century (in principle at least) was no longer off the table.
The question is therefore: why use yet another term? Of course, ‘reactionary’ was already present in Reactionary Democracy but it was mostly undefined, used as an umbrella. As various events have unfolded since the book was written, it has become clear that the term can actually be particularly useful to shed further light on the moment we are living in and the threats we are facing. While I will be using far and extreme right in the manners defined above, reactionary can allow us to go beyond and speak to a new stage of politics. While its nature is intricately linked to far and extreme-right politics, it also goes beyond. It is therefore not instead, but as well as.
First, and building on Corey Robin’s work (2018), reactionary politics should not simply be understood as a reaction. While there is of course a degree of reaction to the left and to change, it would be mistaken to think that these are grounded in reality, as if the left was triumphant and had succeeded in overthrowing the old order. No doubt reactionaries fear the advent of certain political projects which demand an end to arbitrary forms of privilege and hierarchy, but this does not mean that their demands simply occur at a time when the balance of power is shifting towards progressive politics. In fact, as we can see today, reactionaries remain very much in control of institutions, whether political, mediatic or economic. Their fears are therefore predominantly based on a potential or imagined swing or moderate progress in the form of demands finally heard by those silenced, rather than a reality. Crucially, they remain tied to capital and wealth and seek to protect these. Yet reactionaries do not simply want to protect the status quo or return to what was before. Instead, it is a forward-looking movement which seeks to (re-)assert privileges they believe to be quasi-natural, where elite authority is accepted and even celebrated. As noted by Robin (2018), ‘conservatism has been a forward movement of restless and relentless change, partial to risk taking and ideological adventurism, militant in its posture and populist in its bearings, friendly to upstarts and insurgents, outsiders and newcomers alike’ (39).
Second, reactionary politics should be understood as a loose alliance of political demands each aiming to undermine progressive change, both actual and perceived, in the name of what is good qua ‘natural’, ‘common sense’ and ‘normal’. This loose nature, which can encompass seemingly different movements from the far and extreme right, but also ‘enemy feminists’ opposed to trans rights for example (Lewis 2025; Amery 2025), is therefore better suited to discussing our current context where one can be a reactionary while being described either by oneself or within wider public discourse as mainstream or even left-wing. This is clear for example in various left-wing actors pushing reactionary politics under the guise of their struggle against ‘cancel culture’ or for ‘free speech’ and in the name of the ‘left behind’. This also goes some way to addressing the limitations of some research on far- and extreme-right politics which tends to focus on individualised forms of oppression or othering, or to exceptionalise such politics, thus leaving systemic oppression unchallenged. As such, reactionary politics can very much be compatible with ‘really existing liberalism’ (Mondon 2024). Here therefore, reactionary politics is understood as against emancipation and for the perpetuation of what bell hooks (1995) has called ‘White-Supremacist Capitalist Patriarchy’ to which we could add Cis and Able, and leave open to other forms of hierarchisation rendered hegemonic under modernity. Understanding and combatting reactionary politics therefore demands a radically intersectional approach to understanding interlocking systems of oppression (Carastathis 2016).
Finally, reactionary politics makes it clearer that this is an elitist, oligarchic (Vergara, 2020) project. While extreme and far right as terms should also make this clear based on the elitist nature of the ideologies and the hierarchies of worth core to them, both have become polluted by populism which has falsely given these movements a degree of democratic legitimacy. Radical right is perhaps worse as it imbues movements with some kind of radical agenda. While change is core to reactionary politics, this is by no means change against the status quo as radical could imply, but rather change to protect and strengthen existing hierarchies or return to fantasised states of nature, again building on long-existing hegemonies. The elitism of the reactionary project should not come as a surprise. As Robin (2018) notes, ‘Conservatism is the theoretical voice of this animus against the agency of the subordinate classes. It provides the most consistent and profound argument as to why the lower orders should not be allowed to exercise their independent will, why they should not be allowed to govern themselves or the polity. Submission is their first duty, and agency the prerogative of the elite’ (9). This does not mean that reactionaries in our current context will not seek to speak for the people or even claim to speak for ‘minorities’ or ‘the left behind’ (Mondon and Winter 2019, 2020, Dobbernack 2023). Yet we should not take the construction of a reactionary people by the reactionary elite as a sign that they are indeed wedded to democratic principles. This much should be obvious and yet the opposite remains all too common in public discourse.
Ultimately, and despite all the claims of rebellion against some conspiratorial elite, cancel culture and speaking truth to power, core to reactionary politics is a cowardly project that aims to protect and restore privilege and arbitrary hierarchies of oppression.
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References
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